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SEPARATE BUT EQUAL IS UNEQUAL:




An examination of current topics in legal education reveals
the prominence of gender issues. Women's experiences in law
school have changed throughout history and continue to be the
subject of much debate, as was evidenced by a "summit" at Mills
College, an all-female college in California. The summit
included a debate about the potential value of a women's law
school, which yielded "To Give Them Countenance". The Case for a
Women's Law School,' an article by Jennifer Gerarda Brown calling
for singe-sex legal education. This note argues against that pro-
posal and in favor of legal education, where both men and
women learn in the same classroom. Part I reviews the history of
women in legal education, the plight of earlier all-women's law
schools and the strides that have been achieved by women in co-
educational law schools. Part II addresses women's experiences
in law school today and questions the existence of a gender gap.
The recent debate about singe-sex education is addressed in Part
III. Based upon that information, Part IV concludes that singe-
sex education is not an adequate solution to the gender issues in
legal education nor in the law profession as a whole. In evaluat-
ing the different articles on the subject of gender, it is nearly
impossible to do so with pure objectivity. As will be discussed,
gender affects one's viewpoint. And most authors have written in
the context of the law school at which they taught or attended;
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1. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, "To Give Them Countenance". The Case for a
Women's Law Schoo4 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1999).
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therefore, I acknowledge that I write from the viewpoint of a
female student at Notre Dame, one of the last law schools to
admit women.
2
I. PAST EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION
Ada Kepley was the first female to graduate from an Ameri-
can law school in 1870.' Kepley's struggle to gain admission and
acceptance represents the struggle many women have faced
upon entering the legal profession, as Kepley was not admitted to
the bar until 1881.' From the first introduction of women in the
legal field5 to the beginning of the twentieth century, women
accounted for approximately one percent of the nation's law stu-
dents. That number rose to four percent in 1964,6 and in 1972,
women earned seven percent of the law degrees awarded; twenty
years later, women were awarded forty-three percent of all law
degrees in the United States.7 Law schools were slow to admit
women, with Notre Dame and Washington and Lee being the last
to admit women in 1969 and 1972, respectively.
8
Women have made inroads into law school and presently
account for half (or more) of all students entering law school.9
In 1960, ninety-seven percent of the lawyers in the United States
were male, and women comprised only three percent of the pro-
fession. 10 In the year 2000, the American Bar Association
2. See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 50 (1981).
3. See KAREN BERGER MoRELLo, THE INVISIBLE BAR 49 (1986). See also
EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 50. Kepley graduated from the Union College of Law,
which is now Northwestern University School of Law.
4. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 49-75; and MoRELLO, supra note 3, at 49-50.
Law professors and administrators made gaining admission into law school very
difficult for women, but being admitted to the bar made the fete of law school
admission seem easy. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) and In reGood-
ell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875). But see In re Kilgore, 5 A. 872 (Pa. 1886).
5. For biographical information on Kepley and other females who
achieved firsts in the legal profession, see The Women's Legal History Biography
Project, http://www.stanford.edu/group/WLHP developed by Professor Bar-
bara Babcock and her students at Stanford. See, e.g., Timeline of Women's Legal
History, at http://www.members.aol.com/aacdrcnnea/lawtime.html (last visited
Oct. 23, 1999).
6. A Review of Legal Education in the United States, 1980 A.B.A. SEC. OF
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR 1.
7. See Linda F. Wightman, Women in Legal Education: A Comparison of the
Law School Performance and Law School Experiences of Women and Men 1 (LSAC
Research Report Series 1996).
8. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 50.
9. See infra Appendix A.
10. See A.B.A. COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, UNFINISHED Busi-
NESS: OVERCOMING THE SISYPHUS FACTOR 5 (1995) [hereinafter UNFINISHED
BUSINESS].
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(A.B.A.) Commission on Women in the Profession estimated that
women account for twenty-seven percent of American lawyers.'
The increased number of women leads to the understandable
emphasis placed on gender roles. There are more women in law
school and more female attorneys than ever, 12 and hence an
increasing amount of interest in the effects of law school upon
women.
A. The History of Women-Oriented Law Schools
Brown's article is not the first to suggest an all-women's law
school. In fact, such institutions existed. nearly one hundred
years ago. By examining the history of law schools whose mission
was furthering women's legal education, the reasons for main-
taining law schools as co-educational institutions emerge. The
history of women-oriented law schools proves that the success of
such an institution is dubious and that the problems of the past
still exist. The past casts doubt on the success of such a school
today.
Portia Law School opened as the first all-women's law school
in 1908 in Boston. Portia began as an evening bar review course
for two women and in 1922 was large enough to open a day
school. 3 The biggest challenge faced by Portia Law School was
the increase in standards required for passing the bar and main-
taining school accreditation. Early in its founding, Portia was
responsible for the legal education of women in Massachusetts
and posted a Massachusetts bar passage rate of sixty-five percent
(compared to a forty percent passage rate of all students sitting
for the bar).' 4 With more difficult standards implemented in
1936, including an oral bar exam, the passage rate dropped to
only seventeen percent, whereas the male passage rate rose to
forty-six.' 5 Such statistics cast doubt on Portia's preparation of its
students' 6 and injured its reputation.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 5; see also A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL Con-
tinuum (1992) [hereinafter MAcCRATE REPORT].
13. See MoREILo, supra note 3, at 70.
14. See RONALD CHESTER, UNEQUAL ACCESS: WOMEN LAWYERs IN A CHANG-
ING AMERICA 11 (1985).
15. See id.
16. That is not to say, however, the prejudice of the bar examiners is not
to be considered a factor in the decline of passage rates, especially with oral
exams. That topic, however, will not be considered for purposes of this note.
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Portia remained an all-female law school until 1938, when its
local counterpart, Suffolk Law School, first admitted women.
17
Given the choice, females opted to attend the co-educational
school at Suffolk. A greater number of women law students
selected the educational opportunity of a law school that
included both sexes, resulting in a decline in Portia's enroll-
ment."' Economic conditions also affected law school attend-
ance and forced Portia to admit men. The Great Depression led
to scarce financial resources for Americans, making it difficult
for men to afford education. Families that could afford tuition at
professional schools prioritized the education of men over that
of women, further reducing the number of potential law stu-
dents.1 9 As a result of these two factors, Portia admitted men to
remain economically viable.20 It eventually became the New
England School of Law in 1969, which still exists today.21
That Portia Law School no longer exists as a single-sex entity
signifies that challenges exist for such an institution. It also calls
into question whether the market for an all-female law school
exists. Brown's article neither addresses nor offers modem solu-
tions to the problems that existed at Portia. The difficulties of
maintaining an all-female student population large enough to
support the institution and of creating a sufficiently rigorous aca-
demic environment must be resolved before another institution
can successfully launch such an experiment again. Portia's his-
tory should be examined, and its lessons taken into account
before undertaking similar endeavors in the future.
Portia was the more successful of the singe-sex legal educa-
tion endeavors in Boston, but it was not the only attempt at an
all-women's law school in the city. In a similar venture, Cam-
bridge Law School for Women opened as the female equivalent
of Harvard Law School in 1916. It was founded by a professor at
Harvard Law School, Joseph Beale, and despite support from sev-
eral other law professors, the school closed at the end of its sec-
ond academic year.22 Eleven students completed the first year,
but by the conclusion of the second year, there were not enough
students for the school to continue. Scholars have not pin-
pointed the exact reason for its rapid demise, but one contribut-
ing factor most likely was Cambridge's requirement of a college
17. See MoREuo, supra note 3, at 70.
18. See CHESTER, supra note 14, at 11.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See MoRELLo, supra note 3, at 70.
22. See id. at 69-70.
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degree for admission (which Portia did not require).2 The
school was too exclusive for an already small pool of female
applicants, the majority of whom did not have the requisite edu-
cation.2 4 Cambridge's collapse provides the lesson that when
founding an all-female school, there must first be a pool of
future students who are both qualified and willing to attend.
Otherwise, the effort is wasted.
To Give Them Countenance acknowledges that a pool of
"strong" female students could be difficult to attract,25 but
declares "[n] onetheless, many strong students would be attracted
to a women's law school."26 Yet, Portia and Cambridge opened
with the same belief and found it to be false. Brown provides no
proof of future law students prepared to select an all-women's
law school instead of a co-educational experience. That such a
school does not exist today indicates there may not be a demand
or a market for such an institution.2 7 Brown fails to support her
statement with empirical evidence or other proof. She stands to
make the same mistake committed by those before her.
28
Another endeavor focused on the furtherance of female
legal education was the founding of Washington College of Law
(W.C.L.), in Washington, D.C. in 1896.29 Opened by Ellen Spen-
cer Mussey and Emma Gillett"° in Spencer's office, W.C.L. was
never intended to be a singe-sex institution.31 The first class con-
sisted of three women, and a man joined their ranks in the sec-
ond year.32 One reason for admitting men included the
founders' belief that "sex segregation grew out of the 'separate
23. See id. at 70 (citing the marriage of the founder's daughter, who sub-
sequently lost interest in her legal education, as another possible factor in the
school's demise).
24. See id. at 69-70.
25. BROWN, supra note 1, at 31.
26. Id.
27. The "if you build it, they will come" philosophy works in baseball, but
is a risky basis for the founding of an educational institution.
28. Granted, times have changed and legal education has been dramati-
cally transformed. The problem of attracting students, however, likely still
exists, especially given the doubts future students may have about a single-sex
law school, including the lack of name recognition, the difficulty in raising
funds, quality of faculty and fellow students, and the views of potential
employers.
29. See MoRELLo, supra note 3, at 73-74.
30. See generally Mary L. Clark, The Founding of the Washington College of
Law: The First Law School Established by Women for Women, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 613
(1998) (including biographical information on both pioneering founders).
31. See id. at 647.
32. See id.
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spheres' tradition."33 W.C.L. rejected the concept of separate
but equal spheres; Mussey and Gillett believed a co-educational
law school reflected their commitment to gender equality. 4 The
W.C.L. catalogue from 1898-99 stated that the men were on
equal footing with the women, which followed their overall
approach to the law.35 "In adopting a coeducational format, they
chose not to follow the model of... women's colleges... [and]
aspired to demonstrate women's equal intellectual acumen for
the law by educating women alongside men."36 Although the
domestic and professional spheres no longer serve as the rigid
organizers of current society, the risk of reinforcing such stereo-
types exists if women voluntarily segregate themselves from men
because their needs are "different." It was that view of "differ-
ence" that Mussey and Gillett were fighting, and which women
who were, or are, the first in any circumstance have fought and
continue to fight. W.C.L. was successful in eliminating the view
that female education belonged in its own sphere and, as a con-
sequence, in forging new ground for women. As women today
seek to forge new ground in the law and alter their legal educa-
tion experience, the successful method of educating both sexes
on an equal level, as used in the past by W.C.L., should be consid-
ered and followed. Unfortunately, gender equality has not been
fully achieved. Mary L. Clark reminds us, "Mussey and Gillett's
early successes in training women lawyers should serve as a coura-
geous example and bolster law schools in their efforts to meet
the goal of gender equality set forth by these women so long
ago."37
Another reason for Mussey and Gillett's adoption of a co-
educational format was their mission "to prepare their female
students for entry into a predominantly male profession" and to
33. Id. at 636. "Just as Mussey and Gillett rejected the separate spheres
approach to the practice of law by working in fields that were not traditionally
open to women, they rejected the separate spheres approach to legal education
when they founded and presided over WCL." Id. at 649-50.
34. See id. at 647.
35. See id. The W.C.L. 1898-99 catalogue explained in co-educational
terms why legal education was important:
The reasons advanced as to the importance of men pursuing this study
apply equally to women. Both are amenable to the law, and ignorance
of the law excuses neither. Both are governed by the law in all busi-
ness matters, including the descent of property. Both find the knowl-
edge valuable either as a means of caring more advantageously for
their own property or of earning a livelihood.
See id. (citing the 1898-99 W.C.L. catalogue).
36. Id. at 650.
37. Id. at 676.
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"provide their female students with an opportunity to experience
working with, and competing against, men.""8 The founders of
W.C.L. believed that for women to enter the mainstream of the
legal profession, they must start their study of the law with men.3"
Instead of segregating men from women, men were incorporated
into the structure of W.C.L. on all levels, as administrators and
faculty, as well as students.40
The founders had additional reasons to espouse co-educa-
tion besides their belief that the co-educational approach pro-
vided the best professional training. First, a co-educational
student body made the school seem less radical and limited gen-
der-based criticisms of the law school by male lawyers.4 ' It was
easier for men to criticize and disregard a school that educated
only women than it was to denounce a school that educated their
own sex as well. Secondly, W.C.L. could avail itself of a broader
base of students by admitting men.42 More students meant a
greater tuition base from which to finance the school. Economi-
cally and politically, Mussey and Gillett recognized that admitting
men was the best way to solidify the position of W.C.L.4 3
Once again, when other law schools in the area began
admitting women, the supply of female applicants decreased.
This problem has plagued all three of the women-oriented law
schools.4 4 Although economic factors could be blamed, the
trend of declining numbers of students has historically led to the
demise of the institutions and as the saying goes, history is
doomed to repeat itself. The historic problem should be
addressed as one of the largest obstacles to a singe-sex law school,
and although Brown acknowledges it as an impediment, she does
not offer proof that the problem will or can be remedied.4 5
Brown looks to history to support her argument but does not
deal with the fact that history also illuminates the difficulties
these institutions faced in the past-and will likely remain obsta-
cles to such an institution today.
38. Id. at 651.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 653.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See generally id. Both Mussey and Gillett were established and
respected in the Washington D.C. legal community, and they based the admis-
sion of men on their own experiences. Both women had moved to erase the
boundaries of the different spheres and by admitting men, encouraged men to
view gender as a way other than that dictated by the spheres.
44. See sources cited and accompanying text supra notes 3, 30.
45. See Brown, supra note 1, at 24.
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W.C.L., although it admitted men, was committed to the
legal education of women. It promoted this goal not only
through the education of its students, but also by the use of
female faculty, directors, and deans until 1947 (Mussey was the
first female law school dean in the United States) .46 W.C.L. cre-
ated a law school that favored women but did not promote the
stereotypes. W.C.L. achieved the best of both worlds-promot-
ing women in the legal profession, but not excluding men.
Women were prepared to work with men, having learned with
and from them, yet at the same time the women were confident
enough in their abilities to achieve an impressive list of accom-
plishments.4 7 If such an atmosphere could be created with suc-
cessful results at the turn of the century, it should be possible to
achieve the same environment in law schools today as well.
B. Women's Legal Sororities
Brown argues that a women's sorority could be enough to
"create a space just for women" in law school. If this is the case, it
seems that the formation of such organizations would remedy
the gender problems that Brown believes a singe-sex school is
necessary to correct.
Looking at the history of legal sororities and their demise,
the members of these women's organizations a few decades ago
found the condition of women in the law improved. In fact, the
improvement was enough to lead the members to question their
own existence, the purpose of which was to encourage women to
study law and to assist those engaged in that endeavor.48 The
President of Kappa Beta Pi, an all-women's legal sorority, asked,
"Do those now aspiring to the profession still need such help
from other women? If there are men who also espouse this pur-
46. See Clark, supra note 30, at 661.
47. See generally id. Mussey and Gillett did not practice law in the typical
female specializations, such as family law. Instead, they focused on interna-
tional law and business law, which is still today viewed by some as a "more mas-
culine" area of the law. See id. at 624, 627. The list of female "firsts" achieved by
W.C.L. alumnae is impressive, proving that they entered territory previously not
open to women, thereby shattering the stereotypes. The list of "firsts" includes:
the first woman to be appointed National Bank Examiner, the first woman
Assistant United States District Attorney in the District of Columbia, the first
woman Assistant Solicitor of the Department of State, the first woman
appointed as American Trade Commissioner, the first woman on the United
States Board of Tax Appeals, and the first woman judge on the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia. See id. at 665 (citations omitted).
48. See Brown, supra note 1, at 8 (citing Litta Belle Hibben Campbell, A
Tribute to the Founders of Phi Delta Delta, 51 PHI DELTA DELTA 19-20 (1973)); see
also CHESTER, supra note 14, at 90.
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pose, should these men be admitted to membership?"49 Even in
1973, women were not assured of the necessity of a legal sorority.
Another such organization, Phi Delta Delta, voluntarily merged
with the legal fraternity Phi Alpha Delta.5" Members of Phi Delta
Delta referred to their new association as "a unified home."51
The members made the decision to join with Phi Alpha Delta
and asserted their belief that they could continue their mission
and achieve their goals while working with men and no longer
excluding them. The merger of the two organizations proves
that men and women were and still are associating and working
with each other to further their mutual goal of improving the
legal community.5" The merger of Phi Delta Delta and Phi
Alpha Delta also stands as an example of male and female law
students finding common ground to improve the law school
experience, rather than perpetuating differences.
Women can establish a legal sorority whenever they wish.
Currently, there are women's groups flourishing in law schools
around the country.53 If women wish to establish such a group,
they can choose to make it an informal association or create a
formally recognized group that is part of a national organization.
Approximately eighty percent of law schools have a women's
organization. 54 Because women now comprise one-half of the
law students in the country, female students have easier access to
one another than was possible when women comprised only one
49. Brown, supra note 1, at 9 n.32 (citing Mary Ellen Brickner, The Grand
Dean Reports, 56 KAPPA BETA Pi Q. 142 (1973)).
50. See id. The union occurred in 1973.
51. Id. at 9 n.34 (citing Elizabeth Guhring & Margaret Laurence, Resume
of Past Events (from Phi Delta Delta to Phi Alpha Delta), 51 PH DELTA DELTA 88-89
(1973)). Brown called their vision of a unified home "naive," a view which
arguably belittles the views of the women at the time, who must have believed
they were making an informed decision. Id.
52. See Who We Are, at http://www.pad.org/pad/Default.htm (last visited
Nov. 13, 1999).
The purpose of this Fraternity shall be to form a strong bond uniting
students and teachers of the law with members of Bench and Bar in a
fraternal fellowship designed to advance the ideals of liberty and equal
justice under the law; to stimulate excellence in scholarship; to inspire
the virtues of compassion and courage, to foster integrity and profes-
sional competence; to promote the welfare of its members; and to
encourage their moral, intellectual, and cultural advancement; so that
each member may enjoy a lifetime of honorable professional and pub-
lic service.
Id.
53. See generally National Women's Law Students' Association: Phenomenal
Women United, at http://www.nwlsa.org (last visited Nov. 13, 1999).
54. See Letter from Lara Hermann, President of the National Women's
Law Student Association to Shannan Ball (Nov. 14, 1999) (on file with author).
2001]
180 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15
percent of the law school student population. The opportunity
to form informal groups-for studying, support, or both-is
readily available and can provide women with the same sense of
female fellowship as is achieved through a school-wide or even
national organization. The initiative to form such associations
rests with the women law students themselves.
Brown believes that a singe-sex law school is necessary to cre-
ate a place only for women within the physical confines of a law
school and cites the importance of women creating their own
"space" (even literally) in the law.55 However, the groups to
which she refers succeeded in creating their own space at co-edu-
cational institutions. It is even possible for such groups to create
"space" for women in the literal sense, as at Berkeley in the
1980s, where the women had their own lounge in which men
were not allowed. 6 Women can create their own space by form-
ing a women's group or even lobbying the administration to des-
ignate a certain area within the law school as their own, but do
not need to separate themselves entirely from men for all aspects
of their legal education. The space for which Brown strives can
be achieved within the current system of legal education where
men and women learn alongside each other. When women form
their own organizations, they can derive their own sense of space
and belonging, as well as reap the benefits of a co-educational
institution. It may even be possible to use such organizations to
establish some physical space for women, but not disassociate
themselves entirely from space also occupied by male law stu-
dents. This is arguably the more sensible route as it does not
restrict women and allows co-educational interaction in the class-
room, yet also enables women to find an area in which they are
comfortable.
II. EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION TODAY:
WHAT ARE THE PRESENT PROBLEMS?
A. The Findings Reported in Lani Guinier et al. 's
Becoming Gentlemen are Disputable
Becoming Gentlemen was first a law review article5 7 and then a
book58 by University of Pennsylvania law professor Lani Guinier
55. Brown, supra note 1, at 7.
56. Interview with Father John H. Pearson, C.S.C., Professor of Law at
Notre Dame Law School, Boalt Hall alumnus, in South Bend, Ind. (Sep. 8,
1999).
57. Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy
League Law School 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1994).
58. LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN (1997).
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and her colleagues. It stems from a study of students at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School (Penn) conducted by the
authors and serves as a report on the effect of legal education on
women. The book argues that women are hindered in their aca-
demic performance. Brown relied heavily on Guinier's work to
make the case for an all-women's law school.59 However, the
book is based on a study of one particular school, at one particu-
lar time, the year 1994.6o Penn, it can be argued, is hardly a rep-
resentative law institution but instead is an elite institution that
does not represent the experiences of women at the nation's 178
other law schools. "[O]nly a few legal educators would look to
Penn as 'typical.' It is precisely its elite character that makes
Penn anything but typical."61 In a Law School Admissions Coun-
cil (L.S.A.C.) report,62 Linda Wightman found that the differ-
ence in performance indicated by gender on which Guinier
relies is not as dramatic at other schools.63
Even Wightman's study, which highlights gender differences
in law school performance, finds that the magnitude of differ-
ence in first year grades is not large enough to be considered of
practical significance. Less than one percent of the variance in
first year grades can be explained by gender.64 One-half of
women earned first year grade point averages above the class
59. See generally Brown, supra note 1 (citing Guinier et al. seven times in
the article).
60. See GUINIER ET AL., supra note 58. The authors acknowledge that their
findings "may not apply to other institutions of legal education which do not
share Penn's history, traditions, dominant first-year pedagogy, and predomi-
nantly male faculty." Id. at 109 n.1. However, their language and tone both
suggest that Penn is indicative of all other law schools. Brown follows Guinier
and also fails to differentiate among schools or acknowledge that experiences
vary. Instead, she uses phrases such as "almost universally." Brown, supra note
1, at 2.
61. See Catherine Pieronek, Review of Lani Guinier et al. 's Becoming Gentle-
men, 25J.C. & U.L. 627, 630 (1999). Pieronek also notes, "By basing their dis-
cussion on the most negative experiences suffered by some women at one law
school during one limited period of time, the authors fail to examine whether
those experiences truly represent the norm of legal education or the norm of
women's experiences in legal education." Id.
62. Wightman, supra note 7. The L.S.A.C. intended the report to be a
response to the criticisms of the effect of law school on women. The report
aimed "to provide data on a national basis to examine issues of gender differ-
ences in legal education that heretofore have been studied primarily on a small
scale or within individual schools" and "to explore a variety of factors . . . in
order to expand the definition of ... characteristics and other variables that
might be related to future academic performance in law school as well as over-
all satisfaction with law school." Id.
63. See id. at 12.
64. See id. at 11, 26.
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mean at their school.6 5 This does not support the argument that
women are not performing well in the legal classroom and
proves that women can and are doing well at co-educational law
schools. Brown urges that the disparity in grades bolsters the
case for single-sex legal education.66 The evidence does not fully
support her premise. Rather, it proves that women are holding
their own and, in many instances, outperforming their male
counterparts.67
In fact, women are not only succeeding, but excelling, as an
examination of female performance at a wide variety of schools
demonstrates. At the University of Illinois, women outperformed
male students and posted overall higher grade-point averages
than their male colleagues for 1994 and 1995. In those same
years, women were "either doing equally well or over-
represented" on the law review, Order of the Coif and moot
court.68 During the academic year of 1994-95, women compro-
mised a majority of students on the law review at Washington
University.69 The trend has remained the same there. For the
1999-2000 academic year, fifty-three percent of the students at
the University of Washington School of Law were female;70 fifty-
six percent of the individuals on the Washington Law Review were
female. 71 An internal study at the University of Iowa Law School
revealed that female graduates had similar grade-point averages
and were equally as involved in law review and Order of the Coif
as their male peers.72 Columbia University Law School deter-
mined that "as a group, men performed at a level predicted by
their LSAT and their undergraduate grade-point average,
whereas women were 'slightly outdistancing' their predicted aca-
demic performances." 71 Women's representation in assorted
"academic performance" categories, such as honors graduates,
law review, and ranking was equal to male representation in the
65. See id.
66. See Brown, supra note 1, at 17.
67. See A.B.A. COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, DON'T JUST HEAR IT
THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE: STUDYING GENDER QUESTIONS AT YOUR LAW SCHool
33 (1998) [hereinafter GRAPEVINE].
68. See id.
69. See id. at 34.
70. See University of Washington School of Law: Statistics and Profiles, at http:/
/www.law.washington.edu/LawSchool/admit/admit-studbod.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2000).
71. See 75 WASH. L. REv. mastheads (2000).
72. See GRAPEVINE, supra note 67, at 33.
73. See id. at 32 (citing Chiu-Huey Hsia, Men, Women Perform Equally Well,
Study Says, COLUM. SPECTATOR, March 20, 1995, at 1, 5).
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same categories at Brooklyn Law School.14 Women accounted
for more than half of the students on the Fall 1999 Dean's List at
the Florida State University College of Law,75 whereas women
comprised forty-seven percent of the student body.76 Similarly,
at Notre Dame Law School, forty-one percent of the students for
the 1999-2000 academic year were female, 77 and an equal num-
ber of male and female members of the class of 2001 are on the
Dean's List.7' Turning to the masthead in this journal, reveals
that twenty-one of the thirty-one Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics,
and Public Policy members are women.79
Law review membership at other schools also demonstrates
the success women are achieving in law schools. Membership of
a school's law review, although the selection criteria varies from
institution to institution, is generally recognized throughout aca-
demic and professional circles as a sign of success. Women at law
schools around the nation are performing as well, if not better,
than their male counterparts. At Ohio State, women comprised
forty-six percent of the student body and the 1999-2000 law
review was made up of an equal percentage of women."0 The
Indiana Law Journal boasted forty-four percent female member-
ship in 1999-2000,81 whereas forty-two percent of the law school
student body was female.8 2 Females represented fifty-one per-
cent of students at Emory University School of Law,8 3 and women
there were doing quite well, making up sixty-eight percent of the
1998-99 Emory Law Journal members.8 4  The percentage of
women on The Arizona State Law Journal exceeds the percentage
74. See Marsha Garrison et al., Succeeding in Law School: A Comparison of
Women's Experiences at Brooklyn Law School and the University of Pennsylvania, 3
MICH.J. GENDER & L. 515, 525-26 (1996).
75. See Flordia State University College of Law Dean's List, at http://
www.law.fsu.edu/pdfdocuments/deanslist.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2000).
76. See Flordia State University College of Law: Admissions Facts at a Glance, at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/admissions/facts.html (last visited April 10, 2000).
77. Interview with Anne Hamilton, Registrar at Notre Dame Law School,
in South Bend, Ind. (Apr. 10, 2000).
78. Id.
79. 15 NOTRE DAEmJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL. mastheads (2001).
80. See 60 OHIo ST. L.J. mastheads (1999).
81. See 74 IND. L.J. mastheads (1999).
82. See Indiana University School of Law, at http://www.law.indiana.edu
(last visited Feb. 21, 2000).
83. See Emory University School of Law: Admissions Requirements and Statistics,
at http://www.law.emory.edu/LAW/main/admission.html#admit (last visited
Feb. 21, 2000).
84. See 78 EMORY L.J. mastheads (1999).
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of women students at the law school.8 5 Boalt Hall at the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley School of Law also has a strong repre-
sentation of women on the law review, with females accounting
for fifty-six percent of journal members, while half the student
body overall is female.8 6 Women make up forty-eight percent of
the Texas Law Review, yet forty-five percent of all students are
female. 7 Forty-six percent of Yale students were female and that
same percentage of women is found in the law review member-
ship.88 Sixty-one percent of the students on the Boston College
Law Review are female.8 9 Forty-nine percent of the students at
Southern Methodist University School of Law in 2000 were
female; 90 the same percentage of the students who publish the
SMU Law Review for the 1999-2000 academic year are female. 0 1
In the same year the Washington and Lee University School of
Law posted a female enrollment of forty-two percent,9 2 with their
law review membership being forty-eight percent female. 93
Although this list is not a comprehensive study of all law schools,
it does represent a varied group of institutions, each with distin-
guishing characteristics. Yet, they all have one factor in com-
mon: female students are succeeding and proving that women's
law school performance is certainly not lagging behind those of
their male counterparts. In fact, the evidence above proves that
women are, at a number of schools, outperforming the men.94
Brown suggests that an all-female law school is appropriate
as a remedial measure, 9 5 but the evidence discussed here sug-
85. Women comprise 49% of the A.S.U.'s general population and 53% of
The Arizona State Law Journal See Arizona College of Law About Us, at http://
www.law.asu.edu/AboutUs/AboutCol.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2000); 31 ARiz.
ST. L.J. mastheads (1999).
86. See 87 CAL. L. REv. mastheads (1999).
87. See 78 TEX. L. REV. mastheads (1999-2000).
88. See Yale Law School Admissions, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/law-
school/admissions (last visited Feb. 22, 2000); 109 YALE L.J. mastheads (2000).
89. See Boston College Law Review Staff at http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/
law/lwsch/bclrstaf.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2000).
90. See letter from Maggie Froneberger, Officer in Southern Methodist
University College of Law Admissions Office to author (Feb. 23, 2000) (on file
with author).
91. See 52 SMU L. REv. mastheads (1999).
92. See Letter from Susan Palmer, Assistant Dean at Washington and Lee
University Law School to author (Feb. 24, 2000) (on file with author).
93. See 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. mastheads (1999).
94. The statistics cover a wide variety of schools: from public to private,
some religious, some not, and from different areas of the country. This article
includes eighteen examples, ten percent of the A.B.A.-accredited law schools in
the country, demonstrating that women's success is a trend throughout.
95. See Brown, supra note 1, at 25.
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gests that no remediation is necessary. Brown's portrayal of
women as "injured" by the law school process is not supported by
evidence from schools where women are succeeding, and instead
of assuming the role of victim, women are playing the part of
victor.
9 6
Another gender difference in legal education upon which
Guinier bases her thesis is that women seek "distinct qualities in
professors and participation in class."9 7 Pieronek argues, how-
ever, that this statement "is without significant support" because
the survey respondents selected the same qualities that they
believed to be most important and differed only slightly when
selecting the third and fourth most important characteristics of a
professor.98 The difference between women and men is not as
dramatic as Guinier would have her readers believe. That men
and women value the same traits as the most important charac-
teristics in a professor indicates similarity between the genders.
In addition, Brown, Guinier, and others have argued that
class participation is a more detrimental experience for women,
with female students participating less frequently than their male
counterparts. 99 Even this is disputable because a sizable number
of professors do not give students a choice in participation but
require it. In classes where participation is voluntary, Pieronek
points out that adult women students must at some point assume
responsibility for their education.1"' Yet, even though class par-
ticipation by women is less than that of men, class participation
has not been directly correlated to law school grades. 10 1 If
professors believed participation was so important, it should also
be graded. Women are learning, succeeding in law school, and
passing the bar without as much class participation as men.
There is a conflict between commentators who agree with the
Socratic method as properly preparing law students, and others
who find it particularly harmful to women. 0 2 One purpose of
96. See id. (claiming that the legal hurdles to an all women's law school
could be overcome "by stressing the remedial nature of its programs; because
women currently are injured" by law school). Whether such an injury exists,
and to what extent, is clearly debatable.
97. See GUINIER ET AL., supra note 58, at 44.
98. See Pieronek, supra note 61, at 634 (arguing that because survey
respondents selected the same most important characteristics of professors,
women and men may be more alike than the authors think).
99. See Brown, supra note 1, at 11 n.42; GUINIER ET AL., supra note 58, at 33
n.86.
100. See Pieronek, supra note 61, at 639.
101. See id.
102. SeeJanet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession:
An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1209,
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class participation is preparation of students for appearing
before a judge. When before a judge, unfortunately, kind, or
even equal, treatment cannot be guaranteed. Men make up a
large percentage of law school faculty,103 and they also constitute
a large majority of the judiciary." 4 In that sense, class participa-
tion is realistic. Women do not want disparate treatment, so they
should accept the treatment as part of their professional training.
An alternative to an all-women's law school would be for a
co-educational law school to adopt different means of teaching.
The Chapman University School of Law adopted a "more
humane" approach to legal education including smaller classes,
mentoring and a less confrontational classroom approach.
10 5
The goal of providing a supportive learning environment was
inspired by feminists and the school found that not only were
students happier, but the class participation of women increased
dramatically when compared with the participation of women at
Penn in Guinier's study. 10 6 Interestingly, a higher percentage of
men than women reported that they "never asked questions" in
class.10 7 The study also showed that self-esteem increased for
both women and men. 08 From this, one can conclude that it is
not just women who would benefit from alternative methods of
legal education. Although prior studies argue that law school has
a particularly detrimental effect upon women, the Chapman Uni-
versity Law School study shows that both sexes would benefit
from a more supportive environment. The study indicates that it
may not be adequate to say that just women are in need of a
different experience. The findings of the Chapman study show
that law school affects both men and women and questions
whether women need to be singled out. The study also shows
that feminist critiques can be considered and their suggestions
implemented across the board, for both sexes, with success.
Additionally, the results of the Chapman approach support the
1256 (1988) ("Most legal academics will agree that what happens in the class-
room is important to the total law school experience."), and Pieronek, supra
note 61, at 639; cf. GUINIER ET AL., supra note 58, at 12, and Brown, supra note 1,
at 10. The Socratic method is discussed further in Section V.
103. See GRAPEVINE, supra note 67, at 4 (reporting that men comprise 73%
of the faculty at the nation's law schools).
104. See MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE RuLEs 15
(1993) (noting that in 1993, 90% of thejudiciary was male) (citations omitted).
105. Judith D. Fischer, Portia Unbound: The Effects of a Supportive Law School
Environment on Women and Minority Students, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 88-96
(1996).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 101.
108. See id. at 103.
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findings of researchers that "the characteristics of the [law]
school and its student body may contribute to equalizing the
reported satisfaction of women and men students."1 "9 Students
have a choice regarding what law school they will attend. This
decision can dramatically impact their performance and satisfac-
tion, and that fact must not be ignored.
To Give Them Countenance points out that even if the num-
bers fail to indicate the dramatic difference in women's law
school experience, law school's effects on women's psyche dem-
onstrates the detrimental effect that legal education has on
women.11 0 Yet, once again, there is evidence to the contrary.
Wightman's study found no "practical significance" in the level
of satisfaction with the decision to go to law school or the law
school experience between women and men.11 This is not to say
that legal education is without psychological impact. Men, how-
ever, may also be impacted by their time in law school,1 1 2 and the
effect is determined by the individual's personal characteristics
and experiences (often before law school), not solely by gender.
Given the personal aspects, it is difficult to generalize in broad
terms such as "male" and "female." Doing so fails to recognize
the uniqueness of the individual and the incredibly varied make-
up of each gender.
Brown relies on the findings reported in Becoming Gentlemen
as support for her theory that an all-women's law school is
needed as a remedial measure. Different schools post numbers
that not only contradict Guinier's findings but further prove that
women are outperforming male law students."' Because
Guinier's claims are disputable, Brown's argument and the statis-
tical basis for it are weakened.
109. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Antoinette Sedillo Lopez &Jeffrey Jenkins, Gen-
der, Legal Education and Legal Careers, 41 J. LEGAL EDUc. 443, 476 (1991).
110. See generally Brown, supra note 1. See also GuINIER ET AL., supra note
58; Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40
STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1988).
111. See Wightman, supra note 7, at 36, 39-40 (finding that the difference
in level of satisfaction is small and "does not meet the criterion for practical
significance. These results appear to contradict recent studies chronicling
women's perceptions of alienation in the law school.").
112. See GRAPEVINE, supra note 67, at 21 (stating that some men may have
a difficult time dealing with law school while a female classmate may handle law
school without a problem); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 62. Brown, supra
note 1, at 4 (acknowledging that her proposal of an all-women's law school
"does little to help the men who suffer in traditional law schools in the very ways
[she] describe[s] women suffering."). It seems that this, too, could qualify as
disparate treatment.
113. See sources cited and accompanying text supra notes 64-94.
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B. Not All Law Schools Are the Same and
Not All Women Have the Same Experiences
In examining the varied performance of women at different
schools, the differences in law schools and that of individual stu-
dents become apparent. Look at any law school web site, bro-
chure, or bulletin: each school prides itself in highlighting what
aspects make it unique. As previously discussed, Penn arguably is
not indicative of the 180 accredited law schools in the nation.
Brown's reliance on Becoming Gentlemen shows that her belief is
based on experiences at one particular place at one particular
time."1 4 Neither her findings nor Guinier's findings ring true for
every law school. That is not to say women are treated equally at
all schools. The A.B.A. Commission on Women in the Profession
found that "barriers do not exist universally, nor are they present
to the same degree at every school.""' A new book, The Women's
Guide to Law Schools, highlights the differences for prospective
female law students and finds that not all law schools display an
unfair bias toward males. In addition, among the women who
felt that their chosen law school failed to do all it could to be
female-friendly, not one student regretted going to law school.1 16
As pointed out in The Women's Guide to Law Schools and other
publications, not all female law students experience different
treatment from the treatment their male counterparts receive.'
1 7
Brown, Guinier, and others try to generalize the females' law
school experience as being similar for all members of the gen-
der. Such a claim, however, does not adequately consider the
unique characteristics of each individual. "Obviously, not every
woman will care about the same things." '1 1 8 The approach
adopted by Guinier also "dismiss [es] inherent differences among
women." 1 9 The generalization of women as a specific group with
114. "By basing their discussion on the most extreme of the negative
experiences suffered by some women at one law school during one limited
period of time, [Guinier et al.] fail to examine whether these experiences truly
represent the norm of legal education or the norm of women's experiences in
legal education." Pieronek, supra note 61, at 627.
115. GRAPEVINE, supra note 67, at 21. See also LINDA HIRSHMAN, THE
WOMEN'S GUIDE To LAW SCHOOLS (1999).
116. See HiSHrCSHAN, supra note 115, at 2.
117. See A.B.A. COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION: OPTIONS AND
OBSTACLES 10 (1994) [hereinafter OPTIONS AND OBSTACLES]. See also HIRSHMAN,
supra note 115.
118. Mary Becker, Questions Women (and Men) Should Ask When Selecting a
Law Schoo4 11 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 417, 417 (1997).
119. Pieronek, supra note 61, at 627. She goes on to point out:
by assuming that all women learn in the same way, in a way that is
fundamentally different from men, the authors make the same mis-
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the same characteristics and capabilities could be considered a
reason men did not let women into law a century ago. 120 To
reinforce that belief would not only harm the view of women as
individuals but would also hurt the progress made by individual
women.
C. Other Issues May Affect Students' Law School Experience
as much as Their Gender Does
Grades vary more by ethnic group than by gender classifica-
tion. 1 2 1 Economic class issues and socio-economic factors can
also dramatically impact a female student's law school experi-
ence. 122 Both ethnicity and economic class will affect students at
an all-women's school. It is therefore possible that the exper
iences of someone from a lower economic class or a female stu-
dent who is an ethnic minority will have the same experience at
an all-women's school as she would at a co-educational law
school. Guinier's viewpoint may have been influenced by the
fact that she is a minority, as well as a female (especially since the
first chapter in the book is written in first person, and indicative
of her encounters in the world of Ivy League legal education).123
Identity consists of an amalgam of traits and characteristics; life
experiences further shape that sense of self. To say that all
women have the same experience denies individuality and differ-
ences within the gender. Conceivably, a female from an ethnic,
lower class family would not have the same experiences at law
school compared with that of an upper-class white female. In
fact, she may not want to be grouped with the upper-class white
woman, whose life she sees as radically different from her own.
Racial or socio-economic differences could be more important
take in their approach to reforming legal education that they assert
the current system makes by failing to accommodate the different
learning styles of an increasingly diverse law student population.
Id.
120. Women as a whole were seen as the fragile sex that belonged at
home. The separate-sphere mentality was based upon generalizations about
gender. See generally MoRtrno, supra note 3, at 1-38.
121. GRAPEVINE, supra note 67, at 24.
122. See EDUCATION AND GENDER EQUALiTY 136 (Julia Wrigley, ed. 1992)
(recounting the undergraduate experiences of a woman from a lower-class
background in an all-female class). Interestingly, Guinier et al. includes a foot-
note: "[s]imilar issues emerge somewhat differently in studies of the perform-
ance of working-class and poor women in law school." GUINIER ET AL., supra
note 58, at 130 n.86 (citations omitted).
123. She attended Yale as a student and has served as a professor at both
Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania.
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than simply being male or female.124 A single-sex law school
could not address all these factors and although Brown advocates
the establishment of a school where women do not feel like out-
siders, minority women or women from lower economic back-
grounds may, in fact, still feel like outsiders among some of their
classmates. In that respect, an all-women legal education would
fail to address the concerns of those students.
An additional issue could be that students, sometimes for no
apparent reason or a plethora of reasons, learn differently.
Brown (once again following the theme of Becoming Gentlemen)
uses language to suggest that all women learn by the same meth-
ods, despite footnotes and a few sentences at the end of the sec-
tion admitting that such an assumption may be false.
125
Different learning styles are also beyond the scope of this Note,
although it is possible to say that the formation of a single-sex law
school may not have the capability to accommodate the different
learning styles of each individual student.
Students come to law school with their own identity, person-
ality, and styles of learning. They have been shaped by their race,
religion, upbringing, economic status, and their gender.
Brown's article considers the effects of only one of those factors.
Failure to consider the other aspects of the student demonstrates
that Brown's view is too narrow. An all-women's law school can-
not address every aspect that make up the individual.
III. Wi-Y AN ALL-WoMEN's LAW SCHOOL IS NOT THE ANSWER
A. Why Women and Men Need to be in the Same Classroom
"Law schools must teach by example. The concept of equal
opportunity and precepts of gender neutrality should be instilled
in the minds of future generations of lawyers." '26
If law schools segregate students on the basis of gender,
neither male nor female students have the classroom as a realistic
example of the views of the other sex in a legal context. There
would be little precept of gender neutrality instilled in either
group, simply because saying the genders are different and need
124. See Wightman, supra note 7, at 29 (The L.S.A.C. presented its results
by ethnic group and the "data demonstrate [s] that significantly different results
between women and men frequently are found within some but not all ethnic
groups .... Combining the data would mask important differences in some
instances, while in others it would suggest gender differences that do not hold
universally."). Discussion of the impact of race and class on law school perform-
ance is beyond the scope of this note.
125. See, e.g., GUINIER ET AL., supra note 58, at 57.
126. UNFNISHED BUSINESS, supra note 10, at 5.
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special accommodation counters the principle of neutrality.
Even Brown acknowledges the danger of an all-women's law
school "reinforc[ing] stereotypes and actually promot[ing]
rather than fight[ing] women's subordination. '127 Women have
fought and continue to fight these stereotypes in the legal com-
munity. Brown admits that it would be possible for a court to
find that an all-women's law school would be "based upon stereo-
typic notions about men, women and their respective abili-
ties." 128 If judges who are to strive for objectivity could
determine that stereotypes were even one reason for the found-
ing of such a school, many others could follow a similar (or even
less educated) line of reasoning. Such a reinforcement of stereo-
types does nothing to further the role of women in the law, or
society in general.
Visibility of women in the classroom has been identified by
the A.B.A. as a means of bringing about change in legal educa-
tion. "It is only since female judges ascended the bench and
women lawyers became visible in the courtroom that the reform
movement to identify gender bias in our judicial system was
launched. 1 129 In a similar vein, one may argue that if women
want to identify gender bias in the legal education system and
reform the current system, women must be visible in the main-
stream classroom. Not all women would choose an all-women's
legal education, and the potential of decreased visibility of
women in the classroom risks slowing the progress presently
being made. Progress made in the classroom will carry over into
the community of attorneys but that requires women to be visi-
ble, as the A.B.A. advises.13 °
Segregating women will not make women more visible, and
it will not force men to deal with the issue of gender. If women
segregate themselves, it sends a message that it is also acceptable
to assume women alone will deal with gender issues and that it is
acceptable to isolate women. Women have made strides by being
in the classroom1 31 and their "substantial presence and growing
role" has placed matters of concern to women on the agenda and
"provoked serious re-examination" of the legal work place,
127. Brown, supra note 1, at 4.
128. Id. at 26.
129. UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 10, at 10.
130. See id. at 12.
131. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 65-67 (Epstein noted "Ladies'
days" signaled a specific day on which professors singled out the female stu-
dents in class. As a result of female action reaction, such days are no longer
tolerated or observed.).
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including gender roles that had previously been ignored.
1 2
Such a statement demonstrates how women have been integrated
into territory that was previously all-male and changed the envi-
ronment. If women segregate themselves from men, they risk
perpetuating a female stereotype and their stereotypes of men.
"[I] ndividuals who choose not to interact are . .. creating their
own stereotypes or assumptions about others. These stereotypes,
if unchallenged, will carry over into the work environment, con-
tinuing, rather than eliminating, workplace bias."1"3 Law schools
should lead by example and serve as examples of institutions
where men and women respect each other, learn from each
other, and work together to achieve common goals. If law
schools hold themselves out as something other than such an
institution and emphasize the difference of their students on the
basis of sex, they condone differential treatment because they
themselves believe that women need to be seen as different from
men, and not equal.
Women in the legal profession strive for equality.' A sepa-
rate school will not achieve such equality, but instead will high-
light differences. "Separate but equal" is not equal, especially in
terms of facilities.'3 5 Although this assertion was made regarding
the racial segregation of schools, the same reasoning applies to
segregation on the basis of sex. By voluntarily segregating them-
selves from men in search of a remedial alternative, 136 women
will make it possible for men to dismiss all women and their femi-
nist concerns (regarding both legal education and the practice
of law) as belonging in their own sphere and unimportant to
men. Such a viewpoint existed a century ago, but women over
the past century have fought to eliminate it.'3 7 In fact, women's
concerns in regard to the legal profession are shared by men.
132. MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 13-14.
133. OPTIONS AND OBSTACLES, supra note 117, at 10.
134. The MacCrate Report and several other A.B.A. publications high-
light equal opportunity for women and freedom from gender bias as goals for
the legal profession. The Committee on Women in the Profession strives to
bring about these changes.
135. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Although not relating
to professional schools, Brown did relate to the educational environment. Chief
Justice Warren wrote, "[s] eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
Id. at 495. Although Brown pertained to involuntarily segregated public schools,
a parallel can be drawn when dealing with any educational institutions that are
segregated on any grounds, including race and gender.
136. See Brown, supra note 1, at 25.
137. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 2 (providing an historical overview of
the progress women have made in law schools around the nation).
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Women are catalysts of change and can continue to have a
positive impact on each other and their male classmates.138
Older female law students "blazed a path for older men as well to
enroll in law school." '139 This example demonstrates one way in
which women law students have changed legal education.
Another example is the recent surge of interest in public interest
law. 4° Such benefits to both sexes could be lost if women sepa-
rate themselves from men. The benefits of both genders working
together are present in many law schools. Students can change
the classroom climate, regardless of sex, 1 ' and women students
can and do alter the law school experience for the benefit of all
students, not only those of the same gender.
"[W] omen must first learn to relate as equals to others who
are different. To do so requires that patriarchal consciousness
and oppression, both external and internal, be challenged."
42
As has been mentioned, women will most likely work alongside
men, either as colleagues, clients, or adversaries. Women will
have to argue before judges, the majority of whom are male. 43
Law school is a professional school and preparation for the pro-
fession should include lessons in how to relate with other individ-
uals in relation to the law. Although law schools are not
responsible for the interpersonal skills of their graduates, it is the
goal of law schools to produce good lawyers and part of being a
good lawyer includes knowing how to relate to others in the con-
text of a legal problem. 44 Women or men who have not had
dealings with the opposite sex, whether in class or extra-curricu-
lar activities, may not be sufficiently prepared for the real world
experience.
138. A quote by Bella Abzug on the A.B.A. Commission on Women web-
site reads, "In my heart, I believe women will change the nature of power rather
than power changing the nature of women." See A.B.A. Commission on Women in
the Profession, at http://www.abanet.org/women/home.html. (last visited Apr. 5,
2000).
139. See MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 13.
140. See id. at 12-13, (The report states that women constitute a majority
of students interested in public interest, but the men also interested in public
interest work have benefited from women working to promote public interest.
The combined effort of both sexes has brought about greater support for pub-
lic interest at law schools.).
141. See BERNICE RESNICK SANDLER ET AL., THE CHILLY CLASSROOM CLI-
MATE: A GUIDE TO IMPROVE THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN 90 (1996).
142. EDUCATION AND GENDER EQuALITY, supra note 122, at 132.
143. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 10, at 14 (noting that the Fed-
eral Judicial Center Office reported in 1995 that men comprised 78% of the
federal judiciary, and state courts are even more male dominated).
144. This is also evidenced by the client counseling instruction offered at
law schools and the A.B.A.-sponsored client counseling competition.
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Although gender neutrality is a goal, that does not deny the
fact that gender does play a role in an individual's perspective.
To understand a male client relating the facts, to anticipate the
arguments of a male adversary, or to determine the jurispru-
dence of a male judge, a female lawyer would be well served to
have learned the law and the art of argument among men and
women. It promotes a greater appreciation of different view-
points, which is crucial in the law.145 "[L]egal education requires
an exchange of ideas... [which is] often most meaningful when
it occurs between those with differing views and life exper-
iences."146 Women and men learn from each other in the law
school classroom, and to learn from only one gender would not
provide the same education 4 7 and would deprive the students of
a different viewpoint, which could be vital to successfully practic-
ing law.
148
Finally, although there have been several studies consider-
ing the benefits of singe-sex education at the primary and secon-
dary levels, little evidence exists to prove that students would
truly benefit from a single-sex professional education. The bene-
fits of single-sex education are arguable,149 especially when
viewed in the context of law school. To imply that the results of
studies pertaining to children also apply to law students ignores a
145. "[W]ithout the perspectives of the less powerful in the discussion,
the law will necessarily reflect the perspectives of the more powerful." HARING-
TON, supra note 104, at 59. This is not to say that women are less powerful, but
offer varied perspectives on the law, both in practicing it and making it.
146. OlMONS AND OBSTACLES, supra note 117, at 10.
147. GENDER, POWER, LEADERSHIP AND GOVE.NANCE 260 (Georgia Duerst-
Lahti & Rita Mae Kelly eds., 1995) ("[A] consistent scholarly focus on one
sex... can lead to distorted understandings.").
148. As discussed above, the different viewpoints of fellow students help
shape law students for the practice of law as a member of the bar. The aware-
ness and consideration of the different perspectives is important for all attor-
neys but may be especially so for would-be trial attorneys who will be facing
juries. Professor Patrick Schiltz requires all Evidence students to read SUSAN
GLAsPELL, A JuRy OF HER PEERS (1917). Glaspell originally wrote the story to
allow women to sit on juries, and it shows that women see the world from a
different perspective than men, which is not only helpful but sometimes neces-
sary for discerning the truth. Though male students could be required to read
it to see, as Professor Schiltz phrases it, that each individual comes to the court-
room with his or her own "baggage," it is arguably more helpful to see this truth
demonstrated by the different observations offered by women in the classroom.
See Patrick Schliltz, Evidence Syllabus (2000) (on file with author).
149. See generally Barrie Thorne, Girls and Boys Together . . . But Mostly
Apart: Gender Arrangements in Elementary Schools, in GENDER, POWER, LEADERSHIP
AND GovERNANCE 115 (advocating a gender-neutral approach to education at all
levels so that differences are not emphasized).
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number of extrinsic factors, as well as the purpose of a profes-
sional education. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein argues:
[S]egregated schooling for women limits their access to
the same educational and associational opportunities men
have, and that arguments supporting segregation are based
on unsound criteria .... [F] urther... whatever the intent
or ideological underpinning of such arguments, they ulti-
mately have a negative outcome for women's equality in
society.
150
She goes on to say that segregating women by forming a sepa-
rate, sex-segregated institution (particularly in higher education)
allows society to define women "unilaterally, stereotypically, and
ideologically."15 1 Such a result contrasts with the aim of a profes-
sional education and the missions of our nation's law schools.
Although debates have raged for decades about whether or
not law school exists as a professional training ground, 152 the fact
remains that law students do enter the professional legal world
with a professional degree. Such emphasis on professional train-
ing does not exist at the elementary or even secondary school
levels. As the authors of The Chilly Classroom Climate: A Guide to
Improve the Education of Women argue, "an education appropriate
for all students.., requires the inclusion of women-at all levels,
as subject matter, in texts, as teachers, and in student/teacher
dialogue."'5 3 A comprehensive discussion of the benefits and/or
detriments of single-sex education is beyond the scope of this
note. Although an important part of the discussion, it is suffi-
cient to state that there are certainly arguments that women may
not find an all-female classroom to be beneficial over attending
classes with both genders and may even have, as Epstein and




The founding of a law school is not an easy undertaking,
and the obstacles to establishing a single-sex law school would be
even more daunting. Recruiting could be difficult, both in terms
150. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, The Myths and Justifications of Sex Segregation in
Higher Education: VMI and The Citadel, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 101, 101
(1997).
151. Id. at 118.
152. See generally ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s (1983).
153. SANDLER ET AL., supra note 141, at 52.
154. Epstein, supra note 150, at 118. For further elaboration on the con-
cept that women are not better off in all-female institutions, see id.
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of professors and students. The difficulty of finding professors
would be especially challenging. At the end of 1995, women con-
stituted slightly more than nineteen percent of tenured law
faculty, seventeen percent of law professors, and eight percent of
law school deans.' In 1996, women accounted for twenty-seven
percent of law school faculty.156 Hiring professors from currently
existing schools will lower the percentage of female faculty in
those schools, thus hurting the feminist movement in a sense.
The numbers of men and women who serve as professors and
administrators in law school fail to reflect the equal numbers of
women and men in current student bodies. Assuming that cur-
rent female professors would comprise the pool of possible
professors at the all-women's school, the already disappointing
numbers of women faculty at existing law schools would drop
even lower. Women (and men) who choose co-educational insti-
tutions would lose the benefit of having as many female profes-
sors, and women in the law school community as a whole would
be damaged. The loss of female professors at one institution
would harm the visibility of women in the classroom, the visibility
of women in front of the classroom. If the faculty at the all-
women's school was not comprised of all females, the issue of
male domination in the context of learning the law would per-
sist. Many current female faculty may not be willing to leave their
current positions. Although a variety of reasons exist, some
professors do not support the premise of the institution and
would be unwilling to teach there. 57 It would also be a profes-
sional risk for professors to go to an unknown and controversial
institution, a risk they may not be willing to take. The school
may not be able to recruit experienced female faculty, and
Brown does not address this problem. Would male faculty be
acceptable? Would women lawyers who have not taught before
step into the academic arena? Brown does not examine the
effects of such possibilities on either the .founding of the school
or the school's reputation if it did manage to open its doors.
Attracting students is another challenge to the founding of
an all-women's law school. The new school would have to over-
155. See A.B.A. COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, WOMEN IN THE LAW:
A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS 6 (Dec. 1995).
156. See GRAPEVINE, supra note 67, at 4 (1998).
157. Professor Barbara Babcock of Stanford and Mary L. Clark of Yale
have publicly argued against the founding of an all-women's law school and
participated in the debate about single-sex legal education at Mills College. See
Brown, supra note 1, at 1. Cathy Pieronek, in law school administration at
Notre Dame Law School, also expressed her doubts about single-sex education
at the post-secondary level. See Pieronek, supra note 61, at 635 n.49.
SEPARATE BUT EQUAL IS UNEQUAL
come doubts of individuals in the legal world who believe that a
balanced professional education includes interaction with both
genders. One option is to arrange student exchanges from
existing schools. Although Brown suggests that such exchanges
are feasible and could boost the school's reputation,"15 it is con-
ceivable that employers would be wary of the single-sex educa-
tion regardless.
Brown believes that a classroom made solely of women
would encourage class participation, but just because her fellow
students are all women may not ensure that a female student will
feel comfortable speaking in class. There is no way to guarantee
that there will not be any intimidation or domination by class-
mates or the professor.159 Looking at past schools (such as Por-
tia), meeting the accreditation standards was a challenge and
could be difficult for a new law school starting from scratch.
Founding an all-women's law school that would be respected
would be an exceptional challenge. If the school is founded and
is not respected, it could hurt women in law school. Not only
would the school not be taken seriously, but also the efforts of
women in the law could be trivialized along with it.
C. Legal Problems
1. How United States v. Virginia (VMI) Applies to the
Proposition of an All-Women's Law School
The United States Supreme Court has spoken on the issue
of single-sex education at the college level both in United States v.
Virginia ("VM!")' 0 and cases before it. In VMI, the most recent
case of this nature and the one with the highest profile (includ-
ing much media coverage), the Court held that the Virginia Mili-
tary Institute's refusal to admit women violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Using a
heightened standard of review, and with the burden on the State,
the Court found that the "proffered justification" for the sex seg-
regation was not "exceedingly persuasive." '61 Differential treat-
ment by institutions of higher education was held
158. See Brown, supra note 1, at 34.
159. See EDUCATION AND GENDER EQUALITY, supra note 122, at 133
(recounting the author's experience teaching an all female class where "the
feminist majority talked at, not with other students... effectively silenced non-
feminist majority. Thus, rather than sharing ideas and learning from each
other, students used knowledge to create a distinct hierarchy in the class-
room."). Although this is just one experience, it demonstrates that it is possible
for a hierarchy to exist in a classroom regardless of the students' gender.
160. See 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
161. See id. at 533.
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unconstitutional in this instance, and the same conclusion could
be applied to an all-women's law school (or any other all-female
college or professional school). In fact, Justice Scalia said in his
dissent: "The only hope for state-assisted single-sex private
schools is that the Court will not apply in the future the princi-
ples of law it has applied today."16 2 In discussing VM, Brown
writes:
The Court suggested that generalizations about 'tenden-
cies' of men and women must be scrutinized carefully, but
the Court might view exclusion of men from a women's law
school (a preference for women in a field historically dom-
inated by men) differently from the exclusion of women
from a military academy (a preference for men in a field
historically dominated by men).63
Neither Scalia's statement nor the majority opinion of the
Supreme Court supports this statement. The Court provides no
indication that favoring one sex over the other is acceptable.
The Supreme Court in VM!relied on Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan (Hogan),1  which it found to be directly on
point.1 6 5 Hogan held that an all-women's nursing school could
not have an admission policy that excluded all males because
"archaic and stereotypic notions" cannot justify discrimination.
The Court held that the only acceptable discrimination is that
which furthers "important governmental objectives."166 Brown
believes that because an all-women's law school would discrimi-
nate in favor of women in a field historically dominated by men,
162. See id. at 600.
163. Brown, supra note 1, at 26 (citing United States v. Virginia (VMI),
518 U.S. 515 (1996)). For a discussion of VMI, Tide IX and single-sex educa-
tion, see Epstein, supra note 150; Tara Boland, Single-Sex Public Education: Equal-
ity Versus Choice, 1 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 154 (1998); Todd Christopher Gurney, The
Aftermath of the Virginia Military Institution Decision: Will Single-Gender Education
Survive, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1183 (1998); Bernice Sandler, Constitutional,
Statutory, and Policy Issues Raised by All-Female Education: Publicly-Supported Single
Sex Schools and Policy Issues, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 61 (1997); Amy H.
Nemko, Single-Sex Public Education after VMI: The Case for Women's Schools, 21
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1998); Christopher H. Pyle, Women's Colleges: Is Segrega-
tion by Sex StillJustifiable after United States v. Virginia?, 77 B.U.L. REv. 209 (1997);
Allison Herren Lee, Title IX Equal Protection, and the Richter Scale: Will VMI's
Vibrations Topple Single-Sex Education, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 37 (1997); Jolee
Land, Note, Not Dead Yet: The Future of Single-Sex Education after United States v.
Virginia, 27 STETSON L. REV. 297 (1997); Linda Peter, Note, What Remains of
Public Choice and Parental Rights: Does the VMI Decision Preclude Exclusive Schools or
Classes Based on Gender?, 33 CAL. W. L. REv. 249 (1997).
164. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
165. See 518 U.S. at 559.
166. 458 U.S. at 724-25.
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the Court would be willing to find in favor of the school. 167 Per-
haps she believes this because, in her opinion, evidence supports
the view that women are harmed by the co-educational law
school experience. As previously discussed, data exists to chal-
lenge that conclusion. 68 If an all women's law school was
founded, such an assumption of legality would require a sizable
leap of faith and vote of confidence that the Supreme Court
would agree with the argument.
The suggestion of an all-male law school would likely out-
rage Brown, Guinier, and many others; yet, Brown wants men to
accept a school comprised entirely of women. Such a suggestion
rejects equal treatment and in fact demands special considera-
tion that by some persuasive accounts is not deserved. In fact,
Brown bases her argument on the fact that an all-women's law
school is justified as a remedial measure; whereas, an all-male law
school is not.'6 9 As previously discussed, this article rejects the
premise that women law students are in need of remedial
assistance.
Such an interpretation is unlikely given that in VMI the
Court generally condemned gender stereotyping. It would not
seem acceptable to let women discriminate (as Brown herself
calls it) against men, yet not allow men to discriminate against
women. Brown does not consider that an acceptable counterpart
to the all-female institution and emphasizes that allowing all-
male schools "further limit[s] opportunities for women in legal
education."' 7' The Court found gender-based educational dis-
crimination unconstitutional,' 7' not only discrimination by men.
It sought to erase all gender-based limits on educational opportu-
nities. Discrimination of any kind, not just reverse discrimina-
tion, will most likely not be tolerated by the Supreme Court.
2. Title IX
VM/ and Hogan both concerned public institutions. As
Brown writes, the possibility of an all-women's law school emerg-
ing out of a public institution is highly unlikely.' 72 As a private
institution, however, the single-sex institution would still be sub-
167. Brown, supra note 1, at 25.
168. See Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long
Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 451 (1999).
169. See Brown, supra note 1, at 29-30.
170. See id.
171. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
172. See Brown, supra note 1, at 26. In addition to the reasons already
mentioned, a strong Equal Protection claim could be made against such an
institution.
20011
200 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15
ject to a claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 (Title IX).173 Even Brown acknowledges that facially, Title
IX fails to permit a single-sex law school. 174 Her solutions of
reinterpreting or rewriting the statute are implausible and
impractical.
Title IX states, "No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance .... ,,17' The statute goes on to provide definitions. "For
purposes of this title an educational institution means any public
or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any
institution of vocational, professional, or higher educa-
tion .... ,7 The language of the title clearly states that no fed-
eral financial aid will be given to a school, including a
professional school such as a law school, that discriminates on
the basis of sex/gender. The language does not leave itself open
for other interpretations and even cuts off Brown's argument
with the provision:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be
interpreted to require any educational institution to grant
preferential or disparate treatment to the members of one
sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of
that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any
federally supported program or activity, in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex
in any community, State, section, or other area .... 177
The fact that women equal one half of the lawyers or even law
students in this country is not a justification under Title IX to
treat men disparately and give women preference by forming a
separate law school for women.
Brown argues that the courts should "reach beyond the lan-
guage" of the statute, a position that robs Title IX of its meaning
and challenges the precedent set by judicial holdings that were
grounded in the text of the statute. Her reading of Title IX is
ludicrous-courts quite possibly will refuse to ignore the text so
that they may rely solely on the "intent" of the statute, and will be
especially reluctant to do so when the intent is arguably reflected
173. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
174. See Brown, supra note 1, at 26-27.
175. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
176. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (2000).
177. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2000).
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in the language of the statute. For support, Brown cites Senator
Birch Bayh, the legislation's chief sponsor, as stating that Title IX
should cover graduate and professional schools because "[n]o
one can argue that these schools have any justifiable reason to
discriminate against one sex or the other."17 But this statement
proves that the statute exists to eliminate gender discrimination
at all educational levels. In fact, Senator Bayh's statements and
evidence before Congress reveal his goal of achieving equality at
all schools. Bayh provided no indication that law schools were to
be treated differently from other institutions, nor did he give any
reason to believe that the statute would exist to lessen equality
within law schools.179 Brown's suggestion of an all-women's law
school arguably directly violates the intent of Title IX as stated by
Senator Bayh at the time of its enactment.
Brown would like an "exemption" for women's professional
schools to allow them to discriminate, which violates the
intended application of Title IX to any school receiving federal
funds to further the goal of gender equity. It is possible that
even if a court followed Brown's suggestion of ignoring the text
and looked solely at the intent of Title IX, a single-sex law school
would be found to violate the statute. The legislation exists to
deter discrimination in education, and the argument for an all-
women's law school disregards the law. Brown wants the courts
to condone reverse discrimination by finding that it is acceptable
for women to discriminate against men. Title IX, as anti-discrim-
ination legislation, does not support this reasoning.
Brown argues in the alternative for an amendment to Title
IX,18° an amendment that would defeat the original purpose of
Title IX. In addition to the legislative history above, the lan-
guage of the statute itself proves that the drafters did not enact
the legislation to achieve the end Brown desires. Title IX reads,
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any educational program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." s' Brown advo-
cates that a gender-neutral approach should be adopted
instead." 2 Yet, the text itself refers to "no person," a seemingly
already gender neutral application; her suggestion of "gender
neutral approach" is vague and undefined. Brown seems to
178. Brown, supra note 1, at 28 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (Feb. 28,
1972)).
179. See 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (Feb. 28, 1972).
180. See Brown, supra note 1, at 27.
181. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
182. See Brown, supra note 1, at 29.
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advocate an approach that allows institutions to ignore gender-
based schools. Congress passed Title IX so that institutions
receiving federal funds could no longer ignore gender, and to
force them to ensure that women receive equal treatment.
8 3
Brown suggests an amendment to the statute so that Title IX
would no longer apply to law schools specifically or to profes-
sional schools in general. (This is as detailed of a suggestion as
she gives, however, failing to recommend specific text or look at
the future application and interpretation of such an amend-
ment.) This reasoning requests a "gender neutral" approach so a
school may legally reject gender. Such incongruous reasoning
does not appear logical or practical. To eliminate some specific
category of schools may also step on the slippery slope that would
erode the application of Title IX to other institutions. In addi-
tion, such an amendment could be passed by Congress, but the
Congress has not done so yet; to infer that the law should be
interpreted otherwise disregards the legislative history and
intent. Brown's request for an amendment is in reality an
attempt to undermine the legislation that could eliminate Title
IX's application in all respects. Brown fails to consider the reper-
cussions of such action.
Although she fails to view the broader picture of such an
amendment's effects, Brown does acknowledge that it could
affect legal education, in that it could enable the return of all-
male law schools. This possibility would go against every princi-
ple behind Title IX, almost ensuring that such an amendment
would never be acceptable. Title IX was passed to help counter
male domination in the educational realm. To permit a reprise
of such institutions would set back thirty years not only law
schools but also academic and athletic programs that benefit
from the legislation."8 4
Title IX exists to prevent schools, such as the proposed all-
women's law school, from discriminating against individuals on
the basis of their gender; the goal of the legislation is evident in
both the actual language and intent of the statute. Both of
Brown's attempts to alter the interpretation or the text of Title
IX itself would likely fail because they undermine the purpose of
the statute and would counteract the positive effects that have
been achieved under Title IX legislation. Brown requests per-
mission to discriminate on the basis of gender. The Senate
183. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681; see also 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (Feb. 28, 1972).
184. See Deborah Brake, Focus on Intercollegiate Athletics Sports Reform: Col-
lege Athletics in Flux, 22 J.C. & U.L. 54, 56 (1995) (highlighting the benefits of
Title IX).
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declined to condone or support such actions twenty-seven years
ago and will hopefully continue to do so.
CONCLUSION
This article has shown that the argument for a single-sex law
school is weak, and there are many reasons for today's law
schools to remain co-educational institutions. History teaches
that there are obstacles for an all-women's law school to over-
come, but it also provides W.C.L. as an example of equal legal
education of women and men that was successful and produced
accomplished alumnae. If women want to form sororities or
women's groups within their law school classes, they may do so
and that may bring some sense of belonging. The individual law
student is a unique entity and his or her reaction and perform-
ance in law school may depend on a number of factors that are
personal. To generalize into two broad categories of "male" and
"female" fails to recognize the individuality of students, and how
their experiences are personalized to them. Factors other than
gender contribute to a student's identity and a student's
response to the classroom environment can be determined by
characteristics, such as ethnicity, economic class, and religion. In
the same manner, students must take individual responsibility for
their education.
Women are succeeding in co-educational law schools. Stu-
dents learn from each other. To limit that learning and experi-
ence to only women would detract from their legal education. It
would also fail to prepare women for working alongside men in
the future. Women are not in need of a remedial alternative, but
instead may need remedial help in the workplace if they attend
an all-women's professional school that failed to prepare them
for their place and obligations in the legal profession. Law
schools would also be harmed by the loss of the female perspec-
tive and leadership provided by female students and faculty.
Title IX has helped bring about equal numbers in enroll-
ment and should not be changed. The proposed interpretation
of an amendment to the statute is not a viable alternative to
today's system, but could be detrimental to the advancement of
women. Women do not need a remedial alternative to today's
law schools. Some women may need academic environments dif-
ferent from that of the school they chose, and those alternatives
are available. Other women may see room for improvement at
their institutions. The best way to address the gender issues in
legal education is to work from within. By working from within
the system, women will force men to deal with gender issues that
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are not necessarily specific to females. Such issues may not per-
tain only to gender but also could be questions of equal rights,
parental rights, child care issues and other topics affecting both
men and women.
Sarah Berger was correct when she argued that legal educa-
tion should be broadened and deepened in ways that respond
less to the fact that "there's ladies here" than to the fact that
there are professional obligations students are not being pre-
pared to meet.18 5 Future lawyers face a myriad of issues relating
to the practice of law (such as ethics) and also their lifestyles as a
practicing attorney. Issues concerning women overlap those
multiple areas, and in fact may be issues common to all attorneys,
not only women. By improving the profession and preparing stu-
dents to be the best possible attorneys, law schools will also
change not only the law school environment but the practice of
law as well. The benefits could be far-reaching. Working from
outside the system would not have as dramatic or as widespread
an effect. It would be easier for men to ignore women's con-
cerns, which ultimately could be to the detriment of future
attorneys.
The A.B.A. Commission on Women in the Profession's pub-
lication Don't Just Hear It through the Grapevine: Studying Gender
Questions at Your Law School, encourages law schools to take
responsibility for the environment which they create. It urges
institutions to form ad hoc committees to examine gender issues,
do a self-study, and then use that information to make changes in
the first year curriculum. 18 6 Women must assess their situation at
law schools in the most objective manner possible before they
can determine how best to bring about gender equality. The
A.B.A. has urged that "[u] ntil women of influence lead the effort
to implement permanent and pervasive changes in the profes-
sion, women will find themselves at the foot of the hill, forever
pushing the same rock."' 87 Such a warning from members of the
profession should be heeded; women must continue working to
change the practice of law to represent their presence and
important influence.
The options for doing so are numerous. First among the
solutions is to hire more female faculty members: professors,
deans, and administrators. In addition to giving all future attor-
neys a female perspective and fostering respect for women, such
185. Sarah Berger et al., "Hey! There's Ladies Here!!", 73 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1022 (1998).
186. See GRAPEVINE, supra note 67, at 1, 18.
187. UNFINISHED BuSINESS, supra note 10, at 3.
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hiring would also give women students female role models.
W.C.L. is an example of how such a plan was successfully imple-
mented. 188 Professors should take the initiative to make students
feel comfortable speaking up in class, whether those students are
male or female. Students should not be permitted to belittle the
concerns of other classmates, be they male or female. Such
action could make law school a more comfortable learning envi-
ronment for all involved, regardless of gender. Teaching meth-
ods other than the strict Socratic method should be explored.
Students would argue that law school has changed little since the
introduction of the Socratic method, and so schools should
examine whether a more modem approach reflects the different
make-up of the student body, as well as the changes in the prac-
tice of law.
All of these are suggestions for a law school experiment that
could address issues raised by women, such as Brown and
Guinier, and improve the law school experience for all students,
while at the same time not segregating men from women. "Sepa-
rate but equal" is not equal, and women should assert their posi-
tion as equals, in the law school classroom and in the profession
as a whole. Therefore, to achieve these ends, law schools should
remain co-educational.
188. See generally Clark, supra note 30, at 675.
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APPENDIX A
1998 Entering Class Enrollment
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First Year Enrollment in A.B.A. Approved Law Schools 1947-
1999, at http:www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/femstats.html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2000).
